
Researchers Publish 131-Page Security Analysis of Bitcoin's SHRINCS Proposal
This article was produced with AI assistance and reviewed for accuracy.
Content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial advice.
Event: What the analysis says
According to Bitcoin Magazine's report on the paper, the analysis estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS. Those figures, however, rest on assumptions that include three unproven conjectures, and Kudinov said the work is not finished. The team is still working on a new analysis of a property called SM-DSPR, whose bound has so far only been conjectured, and on tightening a reprogramming step and improving a bound against quantum attackers, per the report. SHRINCS is a hash-based scheme, meaning its security rests on hash functions rather than the elliptic curve math underpinning today's Bitcoin signatures. Per Bitcoin Magazine, it places two designs under one key: a stateful part built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback built on SLH-DSA. Because both components use the same hash function, Kudinov said, the proof has to cover both. Signature size is described as the main cost of the proposal. Under the draft, stateful SHRINCS signatures run from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes, the report said. For comparison, Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin today are 64 bytes, and ECDSA signatures typically come in around 71 bytes, according to the same report. Since signatures occupy scarce block space, larger ones mean fewer transactions fit into each block.Analysis: The stateful risk and network trade-offs
CoinHours analysis: the Bitcoin Magazine report lays out a specific danger tied to the compact stateful path. It relies on one-time keys, and if a wallet accidentally reuses one, an attacker can forge a signature for that address and steal the funds. Wallet software therefore has to track the state of every key. The stateless path avoids that danger but at a much larger size, per the report. Jonas Nick, Blockstream's director of research, told Isabel Foxen Duke, head of the MARA Foundation, on MARA Foundation TV that wallets must automatically fall back to the stateless path whenever a state counter could be compromised. "It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens," Nick said, according to the report. "Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly." Nick also flagged a network-level concern. "We don't know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures," he said, per Bitcoin Magazine. "And it's not just the fee market, it's also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin." In his framing, the cost of heavy use of the larger signatures is borne by the network's capacity, separate from whether the underlying proofs hold up. For market context, CoinHours' saved Alternative.me Fear & Greed reading for Nov. 20, 2026 was 12, classified as "Extreme Fear." That figure says nothing about SHRINCS' technical merits.What comes next: peer review and the BIP process
The authors are explicit that the analysis needs further scrutiny. Kudinov said it has not been sufficiently peer reviewed, and the project's GitHub repository warns that the documents may contain errors and should not be the sole basis for deploying SHRINCS, according to Bitcoin Magazine. "We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes," Kudinov wrote, asking readers to open an issue if they find one. The team also produced two results that are not specific to SHRINCS: a classical bound for a property called ITSR without reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. Kudinov said these also apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA, the existing hash-based schemes that SHRINCS borrows from, and that they were published as separate papers, the report said. The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SHRINCS remains open for comment. "We need all the possible feedback — engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers," Kudinov said of the BIP, per the report. "There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise." The report also noted that the work lands as quantum risk climbs the agenda, pointing to a global securities regulators' group warning this week that moving blockchains to quantum-resistant cryptography may be especially hard, and to researchers who recently built a post-quantum defense for the Lightning Network after Bitcoin's first quantum-safe transaction was shown without a fork. The authors frame the current security bounds as provisional, pending further peer review and resolution of the outstanding work on SM-DSPR and quantum attack bounds.Further reading / context
Frequently Asked Questions
What security level does the SHRINCS analysis estimate?+
The analysis estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, though these estimates rest on three unproven conjectures and the work remains unfinished.
How does SHRINCS' signature size compare to current Bitcoin signatures?+
SHRINCS stateful signatures range 548–4,619 bytes and stateless signatures are 5,777 bytes, compared to 64 bytes for Schnorr and ~71 bytes for ECDSA, consuming significantly more block space.
What is the main security risk with SHRINCS' stateful design?+
If a wallet accidentally reuses a one-time key in the stateful path, an attacker can forge a signature and steal funds, making precise state tracking by wallet developers operationally critical.
What stage is SHRINCS at in Bitcoin's adoption process?+
The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for SHRINCS remains open for comment. The analysis has not been sufficiently peer reviewed, and authors warn documents may contain errors and should not be the sole deployment basis.
Sources & Further Reading
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